Cases - Roads v Central Trains Ltd

Record details

Name
Roads v Central Trains Ltd
Date
[2004]
Citation
EWCA Civ 1541
Legislation

Disability Discrimination Act 1995

Keywords
Reasonable adjustment duty to rail station - access for wheelchair
Summary

Mr Roads (R) is disabled and dependent upon an electric wheelchair for mobility. He has difficulty in gaining access at Thetford railway station to platform 1, the eastbound Norwich line. Whether he has arrived from Norwich and wishes to cross the track for the return journey, or whether he has gone into Thetford and now wishes to return to Norwich, the only access is from the forecourt on the south side of the station, where the ticket office is located. He cannot use the footbridge, and the alternative half mile route east along Station Lane, which returns west to platform 1, is negotiable only with excessive difficulty and risk in his wheelchair. At the time at which this case was brought, the duty to alter physical features was not yet in force.

R brought a claim against Central Trains Ltd (C) contending that they had breached the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (DDA) in failing to provide him with a reasonable adjustment, namely the provision of a taxi to transfer him via the Station Lane route in his wheelchair. C contended that by going west to Ely, R could cross in safety to the Norwich Line for his return journey, and that by making this provision they have discharged their duty to him.

R brought a claim of discrimination contrary to the DDA. The claim was dismissed, on the basis that it was not reasonable in the circumstances of the case for Central Trains to make such provisions. R, supported by the Disability Rights Commission, appealed against the decision, on the basis of the finding itself and the way in which it had been reached. C cross appealed, contending that the judge overlooked whether it was unreasonably difficult for disabled persons generally, not just Mr Roads, to use the alternative route unaided (and thus whether the duty under s. 21 had been breached at all).

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal. They held that:

  • Section 21 sets out a duty resting on service providers, who, whilst not being expected to anticipate the needs of every individual who may use their service, must think about and provide for features which may impeded persons with particular kinds of disability - impaired vision and so on. The practical way of applying section 21 in discrimination proceedings will usually be to focus the question and the answer on people with the same kind of disability as R.
  • When considering the right created by section 19 of the DDA, there is a double test: does the particular feature impede people with one or more kinds of disability; if it does, has it impeded the claimant?
  • When considering what is a 'reasonable alternative method of service' (as in section 21(2)(d)), what is reasonable is not always straightforward. Where there is only one practicable solution, it may have to be treated as reasonable even if it is demeaning or onerous for disabled people to use it. If on the other hand, there is a range of solutions, the fact that one of them, if it is stood alone, would satisfy section 21(2)(d) may not be enough to afford a defence. This is because the policy of the Act is what its was held to be by Mnors Ch in In re Holy Cross Pershore [2002] Fam 1 105 'to provide access to a service as close as it is reasonably possible to get to the standard normally offered to the public at large'. Whilst the Act does not require the court to make nice choices between comparably reasonable solutions, it makes comparison inescapable where a proffered solution is said not to be reasonable precisely because a better one in terms of practicality or of the legislative policy is available.
  • The judge should have addressed the question of impeded access in relation to wheelchair users as a class before asking it and answering it in relation to R. In light of the observations made by the judge on the evidence of those accessing the Station Lane route, he would have answered the question of whether or the service was impossible or unreasonably difficult for wheelchair users, as well as for R himself, in the affirmative had he addressed it as he should have done.
  • The policy of the DDA is not a minimalist policy of simply ensuring that some access is available to the disabled: it is, so far as reasonably practicable, to approximate the access enjoyed by disabled persons to that enjoyed by the rest of the public. Thus access via Ely, while plainly relevant, is not by itself an answer.
  • In light of: the fact that C had agreed in pre-trail correspondence that the cost of bringing an adapted taxi from Norwich would not be relied on in relation to the reasonableness of making the provision sought; the policy of the Act; the relative infrequency of the problem; the advance notice which C would have of R's travelling, the decision could only have gone in R's favour.
  • Requiring R to spend over an hour travelling in the wrong direction and then back again when at no cost to c a taxi could be waiting to transfer R in minutes to the other side of the track at Thetford could not on any fair view, given the policy of the Act, be called a reasonable alternative method of reaching platform 1.
  • Judgment was entered in the sum fixed by the judge of £1,000 general damages together with £97 special damages.

While this case turned very much on its facts (particularly given that cost was not an issue) there are nevertheless some key points to draw from it. The judgment affirms the policy behind the Act, most particularly that it is not a 'minimalist Act', and that access should be afforded as close as possible to that offered to the public at large. It also emphasises the 'anticipatory' nature of the duty, owed to disabled persons at large (as expressed in the DRC Part 3 Code of Practice on Access to Goods, Facilities Services and Premises) and the importance of this.

There are also implications in this judgment for the options set out in section 21(4) of the DDA, in relation to addressing physical features. It seems clear that, when considering whether a reasonable adjustment has been made, courts will be able to take consider whether a different approach could have been taken - for example, whether a feature should have been removed, rather than providing an alternative means of service - rather than being confined to assessing whether the one step taken has resulted in the barrier to service being addressed.