Cases - Midtown Ltd v City of London Real Property Company Ltd; Joseph and others v City of London Real Property Co Ltd

Record details

Name
Midtown Ltd v City of London Real Property Company Ltd; Joseph and others v City of London Real Property Co Ltd
Date
[2005]; [2005]; [2005]; (2005); [2005]; [2005]
Citation
EWHC 33 (Ch); 1 EGLR 65; 14 EG 130; 04 EG 166 (CS); Times, 14 February; All ER (D) 164 (Jan)
Legislation
Keywords
Rights of light - interference - whether non-natural light should be taken into consideration when assessing interference - injunction - conduct - damages in substitution - whether damages would be an adequate remedy
Summary

The freehold and leasehold owners of a property brought actions against the defendant, who proposed to develop his adjacent site. The claimants asserted that the defendant's proposals would interfere to a substantial degree with their rights to light. Using the 50/50 rule, the defendant's development would reduce the light to below 50% well lit. However, the offices were habitually lit by artificial light. The defendant argued that this was the modern practice in offices and that the reduction of natural light was irrelevant, if the lighting was actually provided by artificial light. It was argued that the time had come to recognise the real situation and to dispense with rigid and unhelpful rules, such as the 50/50 rule.

The judge rejected the defendant's argument for a number of reasons:

  • It would mean that there would never be a successful challenge to an infringement of light because it could always be said, no matter how much actual light was taken away, that it was possible to fill the gap with artificial light.
  • It undermined the potential advantages in particular cases of natural light over artificial light.
  • It failed to take account of potential future uses of the site. Redevelopment could involve greater use of natural light.
  • While other owners in the City might have been prepared to give up their rights to natural light, it would not be appropriate to require an owner's rights to be bargained away against his wishes.

Nonetheless, the judge did take into account the use of artificial light as a factor in deciding not to award an injunction to the leasehold owners of the property. It is suggested that the refusal of an injunction on the basis that artificial light is used by a claimant would effectively require the claimant's rights to be bargained away, which would be contrary to the last of the judge's reasons set out above.